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Abstract— This paper studies optimal pricing and rebal-
ancing policies for Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD)
systems. We take a macroscopic planning perspective to tackle
a profit maximization problem while ensuring that the system
is load-balanced. We begin by describing the system using a
dynamic fluid model to show the existence and stability of an
equilibrium (i.e., load balance) through pricing policies. We
then develop an optimization framework that allows us to find
optimal policies in terms of pricing and rebalancing. We first
maximize profit by only using pricing policies, then incorporate
rebalancing, and finally we consider whether the solution is
found sequentially or jointly. We apply each approach on a
data-driven case study using real taxi data from New York
City. Depending on which benchmarking solution we use, the
joint problem (i.e., pricing and rebalancing) increases profits
by 7% to 40%.
Index Terms— Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand Systems;
Revenue Maximization; Load balancing; Pricing; Optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
WITH the rise of Mobility-on-Demand (MoD) services(e.g. Uber, Lyft, DiDi) and the rapid technological
evolution of self-driving vehicles, we are closer to having
Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) systems. A cru-
cial step in the proper functioning of such a service is to
define pricing, rebalancing and routing policies for the fleet
of vehicles. This paper focuses on the first two issues, while
the interested reader is directed to [1] for a discussion on
routing and rebalancing.
Pricing policies play an important role as they modulate
the inflow of customers traveling between regions in the
network. As a result, the controller has the ability to choose
prices such that the induced demand ensures a balanced
load of customers and vehicles arriving at each location.
Additionally, selecting prices enables the operator to modify
demand such that the system can operate with smaller or
larger fleet sizes. If we restrict a pricing policy to one that
requires balancing the load in every node, we expect the
solution to concentrate on balancing the network rather than
choosing a set of prices to maximize profit. To give the
pricing policy more flexibility, AMoD systems can leverage
rebalancing policies, i.e., send empty vehicles from regions
with excess supply of vehicles to regions with excess demand
of trips (see Fig.1) with the objective of achieving higher
profit.
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Fig. 1: Requested taxi trips on January 15, 2015 10:38 a.m. in NYC.
Blue and Orange circles represent origins and destinations respectively. One
can observe that at this time, the Financial District (south) is an attractive
destination but not origin. Hence, we expect taxis to rebalance to more
attractive pickup locations.
Related Literature: Researchers have tackled the pricing
problem using two main settings: one-sided, or two-sided
markets depending on whether the MoD controller has full or
limited control over the supply. In particular, one-sided mar-
kets assume full control over the vehicles [2], [3], whereas
two-sided markets consider self-interested suppliers [2], [4].
To the best of our knowledge, all these optimal pricing
policies, except [3], do not rebalance externally. Rather, they
incentivize the supply (human drivers) to reallocate by the
use of compensations. Our model differs from [3], which
uses a microscopic model and Reinforcement Learning tech-
niques, by the level of abstraction performed. Alternatively
to a microscopic model we employ a macroscopic (planning)
model to assess the benefits of jointly solving the pricing and
rebalancing problem over other approaches.
The rebalancing literature has tackled the problem without
the help of pricing incentives. For AMoD systems this
problem has been studied using simulation models [5]–
[7], queuing-theoretical models [8], [9], network-flow mod-
els [10], [11] and it has also been studied jointly with
routing schemes [1], [12]. In [5], the rebalancing of an
AMoD system is addressed using a data-driven parametric
controller which is available for real-time implementation.
Alternatively, in [10], the rebalancing problem is studied
using a steady-state fluid model which serves as a basis for
this paper.
Key contributions: In this work we provide a theoretical
framework to design optimal pricing policies for an AMoD
provider. We analyze the system in the spirit of [13], con-
verting the problem into profit maximization rather than an
operational cost minimization. Different from the existing
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methods in pricing, we consider the destination of a customer
when designing the pricing policy. This allows the fleet
controller to modulate demand in such a way that the system
is balanced by solely adjusting prices. Additionally, we incor-
porate the rebalancing policy optimization framework in [13]
and formulate a joint optimization model. We compare this
joint strategy with four different methodologies. First by only
finding optimal prices, second by only rebalancing the fleet,
third by sequentially solving the rebalancing and then pricing
of the system, and fourth by jointly estimating pricing and
rebalancing with a unique surge price by origin. We apply
each approach to two case studies; one, with simulated data;
and another, with real taxi data from New York City.
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II we introduce the fluid model consisting of queues
of customers and vehicles at every region. In Section III,
we show that the system is well-posed and establish the
existence of a load balance equilibrium through the selection
of prices. We also obtain local stability results. Next, in
Section IV, we state the problems of optimal pricing, optimal
rebalancing and the joint formulation of these two. Then,
we present case studies to assess the performance of the
joint formulation in Section V. Finally, in Section VI we
conclude.
II. MODEL
In this section we present a steady-state deterministic fluid
model to find optimal prices in an AMoD system while en-
suring service to customers. This model is intended to serve
as a relaxation of the corresponding stochastic queueing
model where customers arrive according to a Poisson process
and travel times are non-deterministic (usually exponentially
distributed). The reason for making this relaxation is the
flexibility it provides to perform analysis of the system.
Consider a fully-connected network G = (N ,A) where
N is the set of nodes (regions) N = {1, ..., N} and A =
{(i, j) : i, j ∈ N × N} is the set of arcs. A customer
requests a ride in region i, receives a transportation service
from the AMoD platform, and is charged a price composed
of the product of a base and a surge price. The total price
is pij = p0ijuij where p
0
ij , uij are the base and surge prices,
respectively, for traveling from node i to j. Throughout the
paper, we will use the surge price uij as our control variable,
and we assume that uij ≥ 1 as the platform is not willing
to charge less than its base price.
We further assume that customers’ arrival rate is a function
of the surge price, namely λij(uij) : R≥0 7→ R≥0 for a
customer travelling from i to j. This function is known as
the willigness-to-pay or the demand function. Let the base
demand be λ0ij = λij(1), i.e., the demand rate of customers
when the surge price is at its minimum.
As in [13], we use a queueing model for this system
with two queues per region. We let ci(t) ∈ R≥0 be the
number of customers at region i waiting to be assigned
to a vehicle; and denote with vi(t) ∈ R≥0 the number of
available vehicles waiting in region i at time t. Moreover,
the AMoD provider assigns vehicles to customers located
in the same region at a service rate µi. We assume that
µi >
∑
j λ
0
ij , meaning that the platform assigns vehicles
to customers faster than the rate at which customers arrive.
Region 1
Region 2
Region jRegion i
Rebalancing flows
AMoD user flow
Ti1
Ti2
Tij
λi1(ui1)
rij
ci
vi
∑
j λij(uij) λi2(ui2)
λij(uij)
c1
v1
c2
v2
cj
vj
Fig. 2: Customer traveling from i to j arrive to region i at rate λij(uij)
and it takes Tij units of time to reach j. The AMoD provider plans a
pricing policy u and a rebalancing policy of empty vehicles rij to serve
their customers such that its profit is maximized. Note this is a fluid model
as opposed to a discrete event system.
This assumption is required to avoid building large customer
queues. For the purpose of this paper, we consider the rate
vectors λ = (λij ; ∀i, j ∈ N ) and µ = (µi; ∀i ∈ N ) to
be invariant (we use bold notation to represent a vector
containing all the variables sharing the same symbol). This
allows us to analyze the steady-state solution of the system.
Finally, we let Tij ∈ R≥0 be the travel time for a passenger
to go from i to j, which we assume to be fixed and not
dependent on the routing decisions of the AMoD system
(see Fig. 2). To continue with our analysis, we make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The function λij(·) is monotonically de-
creasing ∀i, j ∈ N , i.e., as price increases, the demand rate
decreases.
Assumption 2. There exists a surge price umaxij for which
λij(u
max
ij ) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N .
A. Customer Dynamics
Consider a customer queue ci for each region i ∈ N in
the network. The queue dynamics are:
c˙i =

∑
j
λij(uij), if vi = 0,
0, if vi ≥ 0 and ci = 0,∑
j
λij(uij)− µi, if vi ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0.
In order to express the customer dynamics with shorter
notation we let H(x) = 1x>0 be an indicator function for
positive values of x, and we use the following shorthand
notation:
λij := λij(uij), λi :=
∑
j
λij , vi := vi(t),
ci := ci(t), v
i
j := vj(t− Tji), cji := cj(t− Tji)
where λi is the total endogenous outgoing flow from node i;
and cij , v
i
j are the rates of customer and vehicle arrivals at t
to region i coming from j, respectively, i.e., vij is the rate of
vehicles who departed from j destined for i, Tji time units
prior to the current time t. Then, we rewrite the customer
dynamics in compact form can be written as follows:
c˙i = λi(1−H(vi)) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi). (1)
Note that as a result of using a fluid model, the variables
denoting the number of customers in a region are real-valued.
B. Vehicle Dynamics
The outflow rate corresponding to vehicles departing sta-
tion i is given by:
v˙−i =

−λi, if vi ≥ 0 and ci = 0,
0, if vi = 0,
−µi, if vi ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0.
and more succinctly as
v˙−i = −λiH(vi) + (λi − µi)H(vi)H(ci). (2)
In addition, the rate at which customer-carrying vehicles
arrive at station i is given by:
v˙+i =
∑
j
(λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(vij)H(cij)). (3)
Therefore, we can write the vehicle dynamics in compact
form by adding (2) with (3) as
v˙i = −λiH(vi) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi) (4)
+
∑
j
(λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij)).
Hence the global system dynamics are expressed by the
following differential equations
c˙i = λi(1−H(vi)) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi), (5a)
v˙i = −λiH(vi) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi) (5b)
+
∑
j
(λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij)).
which describe a non-linear, time-delayed, time-invariant,
right-hand discontinuous system.
III. WELL POSEDNESS, EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY
Similar to [13], we say that the system (5) is well posed if
two conditions are satisfied: (i) for any initial condition, there
exists a solution of the differential equations in (5), and (ii),
the number of vehicles in the system remain invariant over
time. In order to analyze the model, we use the framework
of Filippov solutions [14]. Let us now give a proposition for
the well-posedness of the system:
Proposition 1 (Well-posedness of fluid model).
1) For every initial condition in the fluid model repre-
sented in (5), there exist continuous functions ci(t) :
R≥0 7→ R≥0 and vi(t) : R≥0 7→ R≥0,∀i ∈ N ,
satisfying the system of equations in the Fillipov sense.
2) For all t > 0, the total number of vehicles is invariant
and equal to m =
∑
i∈N vi(0).
Proof: For the first claim, we use the framework developed
by [15]. In particular, we check that all assumptions and
conditions of [15, Thm II-1] are satisfied. This theorem,
ensures the existence of Fillipov solutions to the time-
delayed differential equations with discontinuous right-hand
sides.
To prove the second claim, we study the dynamics of
the vehicles in the system, which we separate into two
categories: vehicles who are in transit vij(t), and vehicles at
a specific region vi(t). For the vehicles queued at i we know
their dynamics are as in (5b). For the vehicles in transit, we
let the total be
vij(t) =
t∫
t−Tij
λijH(vi(τ)) + (λij − µi)H(ci(τ))H(vi(τ)) dτ,
and their dynamics are
v˙ij(t) = λijH(vi) + (λij − µi)H(ci)H(vi)
−(λijH(vji ) + (λij − µi)H(cji )H(vji )).
Moreover, the total number of vehicles in the system is
m(t) =
∑
i vi(t) +
∑
ij vij(t), with dynamics
m˙(t) =
∑
i
v˙i(t) +
∑
ij
v˙ij(t), (6a)
=
∑
i
(− λiH(vi) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi) (6b)
+
∑
j
λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij)
)
+
∑
ij
v˙ij ,
=
∑
ij
−λijH(vi) + (λij − µi)H(ci)H(vi) (6c)
+
∑
ij
λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij) +
∑
ij
v˙ij ,
= 0. (6d)
Note that to obtain the above result we have expanded the
first sum term in (6a) using (5b), rearranged terms and found
that −∑i v˙i(t) = ∑ij v˙ij(t) =⇒ m˙ = 0, which implies
that the fleet size remains invariant over time.
A. Equilibria
We say that the system is in equilibrium if customer
queues (and therefore, waiting times) do not grow infinite.
We show the existence of an equilibrium in the fluid model
(5) when we control the prices of every origin-destination
pair. Additionally, we show that by having the ability to
control the prices, one can have find multiple equilibria for
a desired fleet size, giving the flexibility to AMoD managers
to operate the system at different levels.
Theorem 1 (Existence of equilibria). Let U be a set of prices
u, such that when u ∈ U:∑
j
λij(uij)− λji(uji) = 0, ∀i ∈ N , (7)
and let
mu :=
∑
ij
Tijλij(uij). (8)
Then, if u ∈ U , and m > mu, an equilibrium exists with
c = 0 and v > 0. Otherwise no equilibrium exists.
Proof: Set c˙i = 0 and v˙i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then by using
the customer system dynamics in (5a), we have:
λi = λiH(vi)− (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi), (9)
and since λi < µi, the above equation just has a solution if
ci = 0 and vi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Setting v˙i = 0, and using
the vehicle dynamics in (5b) we have
0 = −λiH(vi) + (λi − µi)H(ci)H(vi)
+
∑
j
λjiH(v
i
j)− (λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij), (10)
which combined with equation (9) and the fact that c = 0
implies that
0 = −λi +
∑
j
λjiH(vj). (11)
To arrive at (11), we used the fact that in the stationary
equilibrium vi and ci are constants and hence, there is no
dependence on t− Tij .
Recall that for every equilibrium solution, we require
v > 0 and thus H(vi) = 1, ∀ ∈ N . Therefore, a necessary
condition for the existence of equilibria is that the prices u
are chosen such that
0 = −λi +
∑
j
λji, ∀i ∈ N ,
which proves the first statement.
We now want to verify that the fleet size is large enough to
maintain an equilibrium flow. Recall the fleet size dynamics
m˙(t) when c = 0 and v > 0 in (6). Observe that to satisfy
v > 0, one needs to have a fleet size of at least
∑
ij
Tijλij(uij)
vehicles which is the definition of mu. This, mixed with its
invariant property (m˙ = 0), proves the claim. Conversely, if
m < mu no equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1 (Existence of an equilibrium). The set U is never
empty, hence, at least one equilibrium exists.
Proof: We use the fact that there exists a price umaxij for
which λij(umaxij ) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N . Then, setting u =
umax, implies that an equilibrium exists. This strategy means
that we are not providing service to any request, nevertheless
the equilibrium exists as we are unable to have an invariant
fleet size.
Lemma 2 (Infinite number of equilibria). If there is a
positive demand tour in the graph, then there exists an
infinite number of price vectors u which can steer the system
to an equilibrium point.
Proof: Assume that there exists at least one Eulerian tour
(or cycle) in the graph for which λ0ij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈
cycle. Then, let λcycle = {λ0ij | (i, j) ∈ cycle} and the
minimum rate on that tour be λcyclemin = min{λij}(i,j)∈cycle.
Then by setting uij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ cycle, we can
express the equilibrium condition as∑
j:(i,j)∈cycle
λij(uij)− λji(uji) = 0, ∀i : (i, j) ∈ cycle.
(12)
Now, we use the fact that λij(uij) is a monotonically
decreasing function and we focus on (i, j) ∈ cycle.
Hence for all λij(uij) > λ
cycle
min we can find a uij such
that λij(uij) = λ
cycle
min . Then, extending this for higher
prices on λcyclemin and using the same argument as before,
we show that there exists a pricing strategy u for which we
can obtain an equilibrium with a tour demand rate with any
value in the range (0, λcyclemin ).
These two lemmata imply that by incorporating an origin-
destination pricing strategy, we can operate a mobility-on-
demand service at equilibrium for any demand rate and with
any fleet size.
Corollary 1 (Minimum number of vehicles in equilibria).
The minimum number of vehicles to operate in an equilib-
rium induced by policy u is at least
m > m := min
u
mu
where mu :=
∑
ij
Tijλij(uij).
Proof: This result follows directly from the last argument
in the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Stability
In this section we study local stability of the equilibria
presented in the previous subsection. As an example, we look
at cases when a disruptive change happens to the system,
either because of an increase in customers or a decrease in
the availability of vehicles. Let u ∈ U and assume mu > m.
Then, we define the set of equilibria as
Υu := {(c,v) ∈ R2N | ci = 0, vi > 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
and
∑
i
vi = m−mu}. (13)
Definition 1 (Locally asymptotically stable). We say that
a set of equilibria Υu is locally asymptotically stable if
for any equilibrium (c,v) ∈ Υu, there exists a neighbor-
hood Bδu(c,v) such that every evolution of the model (5)
starting at (c(τ),v(τ)) = (c,v), and with (c(0),v(0)) ∈
Bδu(c,v) has a limit which belongs to the equilibrium set
Υu i.e., (limt−→+∞ c(t), limt−→+∞ v(t)) ∈ Υu, where τ ∈
[−maxi,j Tij , 0) and
Bδu(c,v) := {(c,v) ∈ R2N | ci > 0, vi = vi, ∀i ∈ N ,
and ||(c− c, 0)|| < δ)}. (14)
Theorem 2 (Stability of the equilibria). Let u ∈ U and
assume mu > m; then, the set of equilibria Υu is locally
asymptotically stable.
Proof: Provided in the Appendix
IV. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In this section, we present an optimization framework to
find optimal prices given endogenous demand rates. This
model aims to maximize the revenue of an AMoD provider
while ensuring load balancing of clients and vehicles. We
then turn to a model which uses a rebalancing formulation to
ensure load balancing, without the need of price adjustments.
Finally, we combine these two formulations into a joint
model.
A. Optimal Pricing
We are interested in finding the best pricing policy that
ensures the existence of an equilibrium (7). Hence, we define
the feasible set of the pricing problem to be
F =
{
u :
∑
i
(
λij(uij)− λji(uji)
)
= 0,
∀j ∈ N , u ∈ [1,umax]
}
.
Then, we can define the profit maximization problem as
max
u∈F
∑
ij
λij(uij)uijp
0
ij − coijλij(uij)
− cc(λ0ij(uij)− λij(uij)), (15)
where λij(uij)uijp0ij and c
o
ij are the total revenue and the
operational cost of request i to j, respectively; and cc is the
penalty that the AMoD service incurs when a costumer exists
the platform because of a high price.
Note that if the functions Jij(uij) := λij(uij)uijp0ij −
coijλij(uij) − cc(λ0ij(uij) − λij(uij)) are concave in the
range of [1,umax], then the optimization problem is tractable
(we maximize over a concave function with linear equality
constraints). To ensure the concavity of the cost function Jij
we need its second derivative to satisfy
J¨ij ≤ 0 =⇒ λ¨ij(uij) ≤ − 2
uijp0ij − coij − cc
λ˙ij(uij).
(16)
Recall that by Assumption 1 (λij is monotonically de-
creasing) λ˙ij < 0. Hence, for any linear demand function,
the problem becomes tractable.
B. Optimal Rebalancing
We use the planning rebalancing model developed in [13].
In this setting, we aim to find a static rebalancing policy that
reaches an equilibrium. Let the rebalancing flow be rij , that
is, the rate at which empty vehicles flow from i to j. To solve
the problem we use the following Linear Program (LP) that
minimizes the empty travel time and seeks to equate the
inflow and outflow of vehicles at each region by using N2
variables
min
r≥0
∑
ij
Tijrij (17a)
s.t.
∑
i
λ0ij + rij − λ0ji − rji = 0, ∀j ∈ N . (17b)
Notice that in this case we use λ0ij instead of λij(uij) as
we do not consider the possibility of decreasing the demand
by using price incentives. This LP is always feasible as one
can always choose rij = λ0ji > 0 for all i, j ∈ N which
satisfies the set of constraints (17b). All the results presented
in Section III hold for this problem as well and are studied
in [13].
C. Joint Pricing and Rebalancing
We are interested in choosing the best policy which
leverages different decisions that the mobility-on-demands
providers face. In particular, we would like to optimize the
pricing, re-balancing and sizing problem. Then, we can write
the planning optimization problem as,
max
u,r,m
∑
ij
λij(uij)uijp
0
ij − coijλij(uij) (18a)
− cc(λ0ij(uij)− λij(uij))− cr(rijTij)− cfm
s.t.
∑
i
λij(uij) + rij − λji(uji)− rji = 0, (18b)∀j ∈ N∑
ij
Tij(λij(uij) + rij) ≤ m, (18c)
u ∈ [1,umax], (18d)
where cr and cf are the cost of rebalancing and the cot of
owning and maintaining a vehicle per unit time, respectively.
Note that to ensure that solving (18) reaches a global maxi-
mum, we must validate that (16) holds for u ∈ [1,umax].
Note that this problem, if solvable, yields a solution with
higher profits than the individual formulations of pricing
(15) and (17), or the sequential approach of solving first
the rebalancing problem and then adjusting prices. This
happens given that the problem is jointly solving for u and
r considering simultaneously the full objective of the profit
maximization problem (18a).
V. EXPERIMENTS
We carry out two case studies to assess the benefits
of solving the joint problem of pricing and rebalancing
over other approaches. Our first experiment uses a fictitious
transportation network to analyze sensitivities with respect
to the network size. The second one consists of a data-
driven case study using historical data from New York City.
We report empirical results of the achievable profit of the
AMoD system when solving the problem using the different
methodologies presented in Table I.
TABLE I: Different policies evaluated to plan the operation of an AMoD
system.
Policy Type Formulation
Pij Individual (15)
Rij Individual (17)
Rij → Pij Sequential (17) then (15)
Pi +Rij Joint with fixedprice by origin (18) with uij = uik∀i, j, k ∈ N
Pij +Rij Joint (18)
We begin with the individual the policies Pij and Rij to
see the equilibrium under a policy or rebalancing strategy.
We then turn to a sequential approach Rij → Pij to
solve the problem. Our motivation for this methodology
comes from the fact that many corporations tend to have
separate pricing and rebalancing departments, which would
result in solving the joint problem sequentially. Note that the
sequential policy Pij → Rij is not included because once
the pricing problem is solved, the system is at equilibrium
and the rebalancing problem becomes trivial (i.e., r = 0).
Finally, the joint with fixed prices by origin policy Pi+Rij is
motivated by the fact that current MoD services only use the
origin (not the destination) when setting surge prices (price
multipliers) [16], [17].
Note that in order to have a tractable solution for formula-
tions (15) and (18) we require a function satisfying (16). To
achieve this, we assume a linear demand (willingness-to-pay)
function, specifically we let
λij(uij) =
λ0ij
umaxij − 1
(umaxij − uij), (19)
where we set umaxij = 4 as suggested in [17]. Hence,
by using this linear demand function, we get a tractable
Quadratic Program (QP) with linear constraints. Arguably,
linear demand functions may not be as accurate as desired
for realistic implementations of this model. However, using
linear functions allows us to recover a global maximum
solution to the problem and assess the potential benefits that
joint policies may achieve compared to other strategies.
For both experiments we let the base price be proportional
to the travel time using p0ij = 0.5Tij , where $0.5 is the
average price a user pays in dollars per minute of taxi
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Fig. 3: Objective function value under different number of zones and AMoD
strategies, (a) Shows absolute values of (18a) when different policies are
implemented while (b) plots the relative difference between the joint solution
and the others.
ride reported in [18]. Additionally, we let the operation and
rebalancing cost per kilometer be co = cr = $0.72 as
suggested in [19]; the lost customer cost cc is equal to $5,
and we set the reguralizer parameter on the fleet size to be
cf = $1× 10−10.
A. Uniform Demand
We compare the solution of the different methods for a
network with random uniform demands. For each strategy,
we let the base demand be λ0ij ∼ U(0, 4) and travel time
between regions be Tij ∼ U(0, 40). Then, we solve the
problem for networks with a number of regions ranging
between 0 and 60.
Figure 3a shows the value of the cost function (18a) for
each methodology. Moreover, in Figure 3b we observe the
relative deviation in profits for the solution of each strategy
against the joint pricing and rebalancing solution. We see that
as the number of regions increases, the deviation converges
to a stable value. To explain this phenomenon, we define
the potential of region i to be the load balance deviation
when no pricing or rebalancing policy is applied, namely,
ζi =
∑
j λ
0
ij − λ0ji. Then, since we draw samples from the
same uniform distribution to assign all λij ∀i, j ∈ N , the
expected value of ζi is equal to zero for all i. Hence, this
convergence behavior is simply a direct implication of the
law of large numbers. Note that, for the same reason, the
individual policy Pij converges to zero.
B. New York City Case Study
We perform a case study of New York city using the data
available at [20]. Specifically, we analyze the data set of
High Volume For-Hire Vehicle Trip Records of November
2019 [20]. In order to analyze stable distributions of trips
in the network, we filter the data to consider only working
days (Monday to Friday). Then, we focus on four time slots:
Morning Peak (AM) from 7:00-10:00 hrs, Noon (MD) from
12:00-15:00 hrs, Afternoon Peak (PM) from 17:00-20:00 hrs
and Night (NT) from 00:00-3:00 hrs. For every time window
in November 2019, we collect data on origin-destination
pairs and travel times of every trip. Then, we compute the
average hourly demand and travel times, and we use these
values to preform our analysis and test the different solutions.
Table II shows the deviation in profits (in percentage
terms) between the different approaches and the joint for-
mulation. As a reminder, use Table I summarizes all policy
definitions. We observe that the joint method outperforms all
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Fig. 4: Distribution of prices u∗ for different policies at different time slots
TABLE II: Relative deviation in percentage of each policy compared to
the joint strategy Pij +Rij for different time slots
Policy AM MD PM NT
Pij -29.83 -8.77 -6.64 -26.00
Rij -33.33 -28.74 -29.20 -40.67
Rij → Pij -13.72 -9.38 -10.89 -15.75
Pi +Rij -5.3 -5.3 -5.1 -7.0
the other methods in the range from 5% to 40%, highlighting
the benefit of solving this problem using a joint strategy. In
particular, we observe that each of the individual strategies
performs on average worse than strategies that optimize both
pricing and rebalancing. Also, it is relevant to stress the 5%
deviation of the policy with fixed surge price by origin, as
it matches our expectations of the relevance of considering
the destination when pricing.
To better understand the different approaches, we gen-
erated plots of the pricing distribution and trend. Figure 4
shows histograms comparing the value of the solution u
for the individual pricing policy and the joint strategy.
As expected, we observe the distribution of the individual
approach to have higher variance than the joint. This happens
given the hard constraint to reach an equilibrium. When no
rebalancing is considered as in Pij the policy chooses prices
to ensure u ∈ F . In contrast, when solving the joint problem,
the solution leverages rebalancing and pricing and gives the
pricing decision more flexibility to concentrate to pick values
that maximize profits.
Figure 5 plots prices against ζi (the potential of origin
region i) . Recall that parameter ζi indicates excess demand
for positive values (i.e., more costumers than vehicles) and
excess supply for negative values (i.e., more vehicles than
costumers). For the problem with unique surge prices we
plot values by origin. For the joint problem we plot the
demand-weighted average price by origins. Just as we would
expect, there is a positive trend between these variables.
The algorithm lowers prices when there is excess supply
to incentivize users to request rides, and increases the price
when there is excess demand. Note that the pattern is stronger
for busier times (AM and PM). Finally, we quantify how
relevant is the pricing relative to the rebalancing component
when balancing the load of the system. Letting r∗ and u∗ be
the solution of (18), we define a load dispersion metric as
follows ζ¯0 = 1N
∑
i |(
∑
j λ
0
ij−λ0ji)| when nothing is applied,
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Fig. 5: ζi indicates excess demand for positive values and excess supply
for negative values. For the Pi + Rij case we plot prices by origin. For
the joint problem Pij +Rij , we plot the demand-weighted average price
per origin.
TABLE III: Dispersion on the average absolute value of potentials when
components of the joint policy u∗ and r∗ are applied.
AM MD PM NT
ζ¯0 57.03 16.62 34.77 17.64
ζ¯u∗ 20.44 4.10 6.80 6.24
ζ¯r∗ 36.71 13.23 28.36 11.49
ζ¯r =
1
N
∑
i |(
∑
j λ
0
ij+rij−λ0ji−rij)| when the rebalancing
component is applied, and ζ¯u = 1N
∑
i |(
∑
j λij(uij) −
λji(uji))| when the pricing component (but no rebalancing)
is applied. Note that we do not define ζ¯u,r as the result
will be zero given that the system is at equilibrium by
(18b). Table III shows this dispersion metric for the different
time slots considered. Interestingly, we see that the pricing
component of the policy reduces this metric in all cases,
showing its importance for load balancing the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied how a pricing policy which
considers origin-destinations can stabilize the system and
reach an equilibrium in terms of balancing the load of
customer and vehicles. In addition, we formulate a profit
maximization optimization model which considers selecting
pricing and rebalancing policies jointly. Moreover, we quan-
tify the achievable benefits of solving the problem jointly
compared to other methodologies using a data-driven case
study of the New York City transportation network. Our
results suggest that solving the problem jointly increases
the profits of the AMoD provider by up to 40% when
comparing it to individual strategies, 15% when comparing
it to sequential strategies, and 7% when comparing it to a
policy that restricts to a unique surge price per origin.
Future Work: This work can be extended as follows.
First, we would like to provide a framework capable of
handling more realistic nonlinear demand functions. Second,
we would like to complement this model with real-time
strategies by the use of a stochastic fluid model [21], as
well as a discrete event system [22] with the aim to provide
stochastic and microscopic results of the joint policy. Third,
we are interested in coupling this joint solution with the
routing problem in [1] in order to give an overall optimization
framework to operate AMoD systems. Finally, we would
like to solve the problem from a welfare maximization
perspective rather than from the profit maximization and
compare the results.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2
We start by showing that vi(τ) > ci(τ) for τ ∈
[−maxi,j Tij , t), which will serve as a key element to the
analysis. To do so, we first assume vi(τ) > 0 for all i ∈ N ,
and observe the system dynamics (5) at time t are
c˙i(t) = (λi − µi)H(ci), (20a)
v˙i(t) = −λi + (λi − µi)H(ci) +
∑
j
(λji (20b)
− (λji − µj)H(cij)),
= (λi − µi)H(ci)−
∑
j
(λji − µj)H(cij), (20c)
≥ (λi − µi)H(ci), (20d)
= c˙i(t), (20e)
where all the H(vi) in (5) are replaced with 1 since we
assume that vi(τ) > 0. The step (20c) is due to the fact that
the system is at equilibrium, i.e.
∑
j
λji − λi = 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
and the step (20d), is a result of µi > λi which means that
λi − µi < 0. Given that v˙i(t) ≥ c˙i(t) and the fact that at
the starting point v > c (i.e., v > 0), we conclude that
vi(τ) > ci(τ) for τ ∈ [−maxi,j Tij , t) and i ∈ N .
Two important consequences of this result are that ci
always reaches 0 before its corresponding vi, and the vehicle
time derivative v˙i is greater than or equal to 0 after ci has
reached 0. This follows by observing that all the terms in
(5b) are all positive when ci = 0.
Now we are in a position to show that v(t) > 0 for t ≥ 0.
We do this by combining the second consequence in the
previous paragraph with the assumption that the initial state
of the system is (0,v) and the fact that v˙i(τ) > c˙i(τ). Thus,
since v(t) > 0 for t ≥ 0, we have that c˙i(t) = (λi −
µi)H(ci) ≤ 0 which will implies that ci will for sure be 0
when t ≥ Tmax where Tmax := maxi{ci(0)/(µi − λi)}i∈N
and which implies that limt−→+∞ c(t) = 0 since both c˙i and
ci will be equal to 0 for all i ∈ N .
To show that limt−→+∞ v(t) = v we use the fact that
ci = c˙i = 0 for t > 0 and insert this into the vehicle
dynamics in (5b) obtaining vi(t) = λi(vi)+
∑
j(λjiH(v
i
j)−
(λji − µj)H(cij)H(vij)). Since, ci(t) = 0 we observe that
after Tmax + maxi,j Tij time units H(cij) will be equal to
zero and therefore v˙(t) = 0 for t > Tmax + maxi,j Tij .
Moreover, since v˙i(t) = 0 the limt−→∞ vi(t) exists and can
be retrieved using vi(t) = vi(0) +
∫ t
0
v˙i(s)ds ≥ vi(0) +∫ t
0
c˙i(s)ds = vi(0) + ci(t)− ci(0). Given that we show that
vi(0) > ci(0), we conclude that limt−→∞ vi(t) > 0. The
property limt−→∞ vi(t) > 0 > m −mu holds straight from
Proposition 1.
Finally, to characterize the ball Bδu we set ψi :=
vi sin(pi/4) and ψmin := mini ψi (see Fig. 6). Then, for δ =
ψmin any path of the system (5) starting at (c(τ),v(τ)) =
(c,v) for τ ∈ [−maxi,j Tij , 0) and satisfying (c(0),v(0)) ∈
Bδu(c,v) has a limit which belongs to the equilibrium set
Υu.
vi
ci
ψi
(
0, vi
)
Fig. 6: Sketch of a variable of the initial solution (c,v) along with its
neighborhood Bδu. Shaded in grey is the feasible region (ci < vi).
